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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2(a)3(2)(i) of the Utah Code (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

Susan's Petition for modification of alimony, both on a temporary
basis and permanently, when the evidence established the
following:
1.

Susan had sustained a substantial decrease in

income due to a loss of employment.
2.

Susan showed a great need for alimony because her

expenses greatly exceeded her unemployment income.
3.

David had the ability to pay additional alimony

because of his substantial income.
4.

David was responsible, in part, for Susan's

unstable employment situation because of his refusal to assist
Susan in caring for the minor children and his constant
harassment.
5.

During the course of the marriage, Susan had stayed

home with the children and did not have the opportunity to
develop a career, as did David.
Standard of Appellate Review:
Abuse of Discretion
Authority:
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-3
1

Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(3)
Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986)
Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 121
(Utah 1990)
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 12
(Ut. App. 1988)
Ridae v. Ridge. 542 P.2d 191 (Ut. 1975)
Harding v. Harding, 488 P.2d 308 (Ut. 1971)
Curran v. Curranf 786 P.2d 205
(Or. App. 1990)
Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406
(Utah 1983)
Beckstead v., Beckstead, 663 P.2d 47 (Ut. 1983)
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (UT. 1987)
B.

Did the items set forth above in paragraph A(l-5)

constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances
sufficient to warrant a modification of the parties7 Divorce
Decree respecting alimony?
Standard of Appellate Review:
Abuse of Discretion
Authority;
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-3
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(3)
Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986)
Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 121
(Utah 1990)
Throckmorton v. Throckmortonr 767 P.2d 12
(Ut. App. 1988)
Ridge v. Ridge. 542 P.2d 191 (Ut. 1975)
2

Harding v. Harding. 488 P.2d 308 (Ut. 1971)
Curran v. Curran, 786 P.2d 205
(Or. App. 1990)
Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406
(Utah 1983)
Beckstead v. Beckstead, 663 P.2d 47 (Ut. 1983)
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (UT. 1987)
C.

Did the Court err in denying Susan's Motion for

Temporary Alimony, pursuant to Rule 6-404 of the Code of Judicial
Administration, when Susan was able to show her definite need as a
result of her loss of employment and when David had the financial
ability to pay the same?
Standard of Appellate Review:
Abuse of Discretion
Authority;
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-3
Rule 6-404, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration
Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986)
Parish v. Parish. 84 Ut. 390, 35 P.2d 999
(1934)
Scott v. Scottr 105 Ut. 376, 142 P 2d 198
(1943)
Anderson v. Andersonf 13 Ut.2d 36,
368 P.2d 264 (1962)
Vignes v. Vignes, 311 So.2d 615 (La. App.)
D. Was Susan entitled to obtain a temporary increase in
alimony pending a final hearing on her Petition for Modification of
the Divorce Decree?
3

Standard of Review:
Abuse of Discretion
Authority;
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-3
Rule 6-404, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration
Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986)
Parish v. Parish. 84 Ut. 390, 35 P.2d 999
(1934)
Scott v. Scott. 105 Ut. 376, 142 P.2d 198
(1943)
Anderson v. Anderson. 13 Ut.2d 36,
368 P.2d 244 (1962)
Vianes v. Vianes. 311 So.2d 615 (La. App.)
E. Did the Court err in refusing to award Susan her
attorney fees?
Standard of Review;
Abuse of Discretion
Authority:
Whitehead v. Whitehead. 193 Utah Adv. Rep. 8
(Aug. 7, 1992)

4

STATUTES AND RULES
Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Ann.
Temporary alimony and suit money.
The court may order either party to pay
to the clerk a sum of money for the separate
support and maintenance of the adverse party
and the children, and to enable such party to
prosecute and defend the action.
Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Ann.
See addendum
Rule 6-404, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
See addendum
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
This appeal is from a final order rendered by the

Honorable David S. Young on March 3, 1992 in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah which
denied

Susan's Petition to Modify

Decree of Divorce

and an

associated Motion for Temporary Relief.
The parties to this action were divorced by a decree
entered by the lower court on November 30, 1992. As a part of the
decree, Susan was awarded alimony in the amount of $1.00 per year.
On August 26, 1991, Susan filed a petition to modify the parties
divorce decree to increase her alimony award because she had lost
her job three months earlier.

In order to obtain financial

assistance pending a resolution of her petition, Susan also filed
a Motion for temporary child support and alimony.

A hearing on

Susan's Motion was heard before Commissioner Michael Evans on
September 10, 1991 and the motion was denied.

Commissioner Evans

ruled that Susan's request for temporary alimony "constitutes a
modification of the original decree of divorce in violation of Rule
6-404, Rules of Judicial Administration, and cannot be dealt with
on the law and motion calendar".
Commissioner's

recommendation

Susan filed an objection to the

on

September

20, 1991

and

the

objection was reviewed by Judge David S. Young. Judge Young, in a
ruling entered on October 23, 1991, denied Susan's objections and
upheld the Commissioner's refusal to award temporary alimony.

6

On January 6, 1992, a Pre-trial Conference was held
before Commissioner Sandra Peuler and the case was certified for
trial.

Trial was held before the Honorable David S. Young on

February 11, 1992 at 2:00 p.m.• After hearing the evidence, Judge
Young ruled that although Susan had shown a substantial change in
circumstances because of her loss of job, both parties were able to
earn

sufficient

obligations.

amounts

of

income

to meet

their

needs and

Judge Young subsequently dismissed the Plaintiff's

Petition on David's motion.
B.
1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties to this action were married on October

29, 1966. At the time of the parties' marriage, Susan was 20 years
old and had not yet finished her college education. Subsequently,
three children were born to the parties and one child was adopted.
Susan provided the majority of the day to day care for the
children.

(Transcript p. 10, 11, 33; Record p. 380).
2.

1.

The parties to this action were divorced on

November 30, 1982, after 16 years of marriage.

(Record p. 132 -

135).
3.

Pursuant to the parties' Divorce Decree, Susan was

awarded, among other things, custody of the parties' three minor
children, together with alimony in the amount of $1 per year.
(Record p. 132 - 135).
4.

At the time of the divorce, Susan was employed and

earning approximately $12,000.00 per year.

7

David was employed by

Unisys and was earning between $42-43 Thousand Dollars per year.
(Transcript p. 15).
5.

After the divorce, Susan did her best to develop a

career so that she could adequately care for herself and the
children.

In doing so, Susan was employed by several different

firms but had trouble maintaining employment because of her lack of
seniority.

She also had a difficult time maintaining stable

employment because her employment frequently required her to travel
out of town.

This was very difficult while trying to raise three

children and was aggravated by the fact that Mr. Wells would not
assist Susan in caring for the children during such periods.

A

brief summary of Susan's employment since the divorce is set forth
as follows:
A.

At the time of the divorce, Susan was employed by

Beckton Dickenson Company in Salt Lake City. Susan was laid off in
1984 after Beckton Dickenson

closed

its Salt

Lake division.

(Transcript p. 15, 16).
B.

Susan was thereafter hired by Wicat Systems and was

laid off in November of 1984 due to a one-third reduction in work
force. (Transcript p. 17).
C. Susan was thereafter hired by Hercules until December
of 1986. Her employment was terminated because of a mass employee
layoff and her low seniority. (Transcript p. 17).
D.

From 1987 through June of 1989, Susan worked for

Morton Thiokol.

During this time, Susan's job required that she

travel out of state on an average of twice per month for 3-5 days
8

each trip. While Susan was away on one such trip, the parties son
was involved in a car accident.

Rather than helping Susan during

this stressful time, David filed charges with the Department of
Social Services alleging that Susan was an unfit mother.

In

addition, David was very rude to Shannon Ledezma who was caring for
the children.

Even though his charges were dismissed by Social

Services, David's actions created enormous stress for Susan.

At

the time of trial, Judge Young commented that David's actions of
engaging

the

Department

of

Social

Services

"was

completely

irresponsible and should not have occurred....and I think your
approach to Ms. Ledezma was irresponsible and inappropriate".
Because of David's harassment and the stress resulting from her
travel, Susan left Thiokol in June of 1989.

(Transcript p. 18 -

23; 45 - 49, 63 - 64).
E. After Thiokol, Susan obtained employment with Futura
Company on September 10, 1990. Susan left Futura because of sexual
harassment from her boss.
Corporation.

On January 21, 1991, Susan joined EDO

Due to government cut backs and financial problems,

Susan was laid off on May 24, 1991. (Transcript p. 24 - 25).
4. At the time of her layoff from EDO Corporation, Susan
was

earning

a

gross

monthly

income

of

$3083.

After

her

termination, Susan received an income of approximately $212 per
week

from

unemployment

benefits.

During

the period

of her

unemployment, Susan incurred substantial debts and obligations,
including a mortgage arrearage of $6176.00.
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Her car was also

repossessed leaving a deficiency of $3,600.00.

(Transcript 25 -

30, 37, 34, 35; Record p. 383, 384; Exhibit 2-P)
5.

At the time of trial, David had a gross income of

$67,200.00 per year.
6.
unemployment,

(Transcript p. 56)

On or about August 22, 1991, after three months of
Susan filed a Petition for Modification of the

Divorce Decree and requested that David's obligation to pay alimony
be increased to assist her in meeting her monthly expenses. Susan
also requested that the Court grant an amount of temporary alimony
pending a final hearing on her Petition.

The Court denied her

request for temporary alimony. The Court ruled that the temporary
relief sought "constitutes a modification of the original decree of
divorce in violation of 6-404, Rules of Judicial Administration,
and cannot be dealt with on the Law and Motion calendar".

(Record

p. 304 - 314, 315 - 322, 327)
7.

On January 20, 1992, Susan was hired by WINCO -

(Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company), after being unemployed for
approximately eight months, at a salary of $3000.00 per month. Her
employer is located in Idaho Falls, Idaho* Because of the distance
from her home, Susan was forced to rent a small home in Idaho for
$560.00 per month, in addition to maintaining her Utah home.
(Transcript p. 8,9, 29, 30; Exhibit P-l)„
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The lower court's dismissal of Susan's Petition for
modification and related orders was in error for the following
reasons:
1.

Susan was entitled to temporary relief.

Rule 6-404

of the Rules of Judicial Administration does not prevent an award
of temporary alimony pending the prosecution of a Petition to
Modify. Rather, the Court has broad equitable powers to make such
an award pursuant to Sections 30-3-3 and 30-3-5(3) of the Utah
Code.
2.
The

trial

The Trial Court Improperly Denied Susan's Petition.

court

improperly

denied

Susan's

Petition

for the

following reasons:
A.

The award of $1.00 per year alimony in the original

divorce decree was designed to assist Susan in difficult times,
such as the loss of a job.
B. Susan was entitled to an award of alimony because she
had

serious

sufficient

financial

income

to

needs, had
pay

the

inability

her bills, and

to

because

produce

David

had

change

of

sufficient resources to pay the same.
C.

Susan's

loss

of

a

job provided

a

circumstances sufficient to support a modification of the divorce
decree.
D.

The fact that Susan became employed one month prior

to trial should not preclude a modification of alimony.
11

3.

Attorney Fees: At the time of trial, Susan showed

that she had a definite need for her attorney fees to be paid, that
David had adequate means to pay the same, and that the fees
incurred were reasonable.

ARGUMENT

This case presents two major questions which beg a
resolution by the Court. First, can the court grant a party who is
seeking a modification of a divorce decree temporary relief while
the petition is being prosecuted?

If temporary relief cannot be

granted, a reduction of income due to a job loss places the obligee
spouse in a very untenable position - that of waiting for a final
decision on the Petition before obtaining the necessary relief.
Until such time, the Obligee spouse must go without, all during the
time relief is critically needed. In the instant case, Susan Wells
was required to wait for over 8 months, even though she had
desperate needs.
Second, when can a $1.00 per year alimony award be
modified, and is unemployment for an extended period sufficient
cause?
For the following reasons, the trial Court abused its
discretion by denying Susan temporary relief when it was critically
needed and for ignoring her financial needs resulting from a job
loss.

12

A. SUSAN WAS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF TEMPORARY ALIMONY*
The Court, in denying Susan an award of temporary
alimony, ruled that her request "constitutes a modification of the
original decree of divorce in violation of 6-404, Rules of Judicial
Administration, and cannot be dealt with on the law and motion
calendar". The Court's ruling was in error, and should be reversed
for the following reasons:
First, the provisions of the Utah Code provide the Court
with substantial equitable powers to provide for the support and
maintenance of parties in divorce matters, both before granting
the divorce and after. Section 30-3-5(3) of the Code provides that
"the Court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes
or new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties... as
is reasonable and necessary" (emphasis added).
In addition, Section 30-3-3 of the Utah Code authorizes the
Court to make awards of temporary

alimony.

Section

30-3-3

provides: "The Court may order either party to pay the clerk a sum
of money for the separate support and maintenance of the adverse
party and the children, and to enable such party to prosecute or
defend the action".

Although the statute doesn't expressly state
13

that the "temporary order" provisions of Section 30-3-3 apply to
petitions for modification, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted
the statute as applying to both original cases and petitions to
modify. Anderson v. Andersonf 368 P.2d 264 (Utah 1962); Mauahn v.
Mauahn, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah 1989).
Second, Susan's motion for temporary relief was not prohibited
by Rule 6-404 of the Rules of Judicial Administration.

Rule 6-404

provides, in pertinent part:
...(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree
shall be commenced by the filing of a petition
to modify in the original divorce action.
Service of the petition and summons upon the
opposing party shall be in accordance with the
requirements of rule 4 of the Utah Rules of
Civil
Procedure.
No
request
for a
modification of an existing decree shall be
raised by way of an order to show cause.
Susan's Motion for Temporary Alimony is not a request to
modify the Divorce Decree prior to a hearing on the Plaintiff's
Petition. Rather, Susan simply filed her motion pursuant to §30-33 of the Utah Code and requested that the court use its equitable
powers and award her temporary alimony so that she could adequately
prosecute her case and maintain her obligations.
In the instant case, Susan's Motion for Temporary Alimony was
properly before the Court and should have been granted.

As set

forth in the Statement of Facts, Susan's income had been lowered
substantially because she had lost her job. At the time of filing
her motion, she had been unemployed for three months and did not
have any prospects for employment

in the foreseeable future.

Furthermore, Susan showed that she was in danger of losing her home
14

and that David had sufficient

income to provide assistance.

Because of her great needs and David's ability to pay, the Court
abused its discretion in not awarding temporary support.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING SUSAN'S
PETITION

Susan's appeal

in this case concerns the practical

application of the often used clause in divorce cases which
reserves alimony to a spouse in the amount of $1.00 per year. Such
a clause is generally utilized to give the receiving spouse the
opportunity to seek a modification of the award if a need arises in
the future.

Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Ut. 1987).

At

the time of the divorce, such an award was certainly warranted in
Susan's favor because of the following:
1.

The parties had been married for 16 years.

2. At the time of their marriage, Susan was only twenty
years old and had not finished her education.
3.

Three children were born to the parties during the

marriage and another adopted, and Susan had been the primary
caretaker.

Because she stayed home with the children, David was

able to develop his career and was in a financially superior
position at the time of the divorce.
In order to obtain a modification of her alimony award,
Susan must first show that there has been a substantial change in
circumstances since the entry of divorce.
found

by

Judge

employment.

Young, was

established

This requirement, as
by

Susan's

loss

of

In ruling on this case, Judge Young stated that "...

I think the Court would be obligated to find that there has been a
15

change of circumstance just simply by the fact of unemployment and
then re-employment and those kinds of events occurring in Ms. Wells
life,..." (Transcript p. 60). Judge Young's finding of a "change
in circumstances" is supported by substantial authority that a loss
of employment can provide the basis for a modification.
In Throckmorton v. ThrockmortonP 767 P.2d 121 (Ut. App.
1988), the Utah Appellate Court increased an alimony award from $1
per year to $396 per month in favor of Mrs. Throckmorton because
she was no longer receiving child support payments for the children
and was unemployed due to a serious medical condition.

The Court

affirmed the trial Court's finding of a substantial change of
circumstances justifying a modification of the alimony provision
based upon the above factors.
In the case of Ridae v. Ridaer 542 P.2d 191 (Ut. 1975) , the
Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial Court's modification of an
alimony award based upon the husband's reduction of income from
$3200 per year to $2300. A similar ruling was upheld in Harding v.
Harding, 488 P.2d 308 (Ut. 1971), in which an alimony award was
reduced because of a reduction of income sustained by the husband
due to a transfer of employment.
The case law in the State of Oregon is similar.

In the

case of Curran v. Curran, 786 P.2d 205 (Or. App. 1990), the Court
found that the ex-husband's loss of a teaching position constituted
a substantial change in circumstances warranting a
alimony from $400 per month to $50 per month.

16

reduction in

Having found a substantial change in circumstances, the
Court must then determine whether an increase in alimony is
warranted.

This is done by analyzing the following factors:

(1)

The financial condition and needs of the spouse; (2) The ability
of the spouse to produce sufficient income for herself; and (3) the
ability of the paying spouse to provide support. Jones v. JonesP
700 P. 2d 1072, 1079 (Utah 1985); Paffel v. Paf fel, 732 P.2d 96
(Utah 1986).
In the instant case, the three prong test has been
satisfied in Susan's favor. First, Susan has shown a definite need
for assistance.

During the eight months that she was unemployed,

Susan incurred an arrearage of over $6,000.00 on her home, had her
car repossessed and incurred a deficiency of $3,600.00, and fell
behind in other obligations. Second, Susan did her best to obtain
sufficient income for her needs. There is no evidence that she was
voluntarily unemployed or that she had any employment options. Her
only source of income consisted of unemployment compensation and
child support.
alimony.

Finally, David was well positioned to pay Susan

At the time of trial, David's gross annual income was

$67,200.00.

Because Susan had met all of the requirements of the

three prong test, the Court improperly denied her an increase of
alimony.
Even though Susan was entitled to an increase of alimony
pursuant to the three prong test, the Court, in its ruling,
inferred that Susan's subsequent employment in January of 1992 made
her ineligible for a modification of the decree.
17

There is no

authority to support this conclusion and equity dictates otherwise.
The fact that Susan had been re-employed

after 8 months of

unemployment did not mean that she was without financial need. The
evidence at trial showed that Susan had substantial obligations and
arrears because of her extended

unemployment.

The mere fact that

Susan had obtained a job did not instantly change her financial
position.
only

Furthermore, the Court could have increased her alimony

during

the

time

that

Susan

was

unemployed.

modification did not have to extend indefinitely.

Such

a

Such an order

would be equitable in this case because of the unequal earning
capacities of the parties.
In addition, the denial of Susan's petition because of
re-employment would penalize her for attempting to improve her
situation.

As a practical matter, a petition for modification

generally takes several months to come to trial.

Although Susan's

employment is certainly a factor to consider when determining the
extent of her financial condition, it should

not be a reason to

deny her petition outright without examining the financial status
of the parties.

As set forth above, Susan had acquired a large

amount of debt during her unemployment and her financial condition
remained in a poor state because of accumulated debt.
Finally, if the dismissal of Susan's Petition is upheld,
the "$1.00 per year" alimony clause in Susan's decree will be
rendered meaningless. Even though the divorce was granted several
years ago, Susan has never been able to catch up with David in
terms of income and job stability.
18

Her sacrifices for David and

the children during the marriage and thereafter have put her at a
distinct financial disadvantage.

The alimony clause was designed

to assist Susan through the same type of problems that caused her
to file her petition for modification.

To do otherwise makes a

mockery of the decree and is not equitable.
C,

SUSAN SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY FEES

The decision as to whether to award attorney fees is in
the sole discretion of the Court. Crouse v. Grouse. 817 P.2d 836,
840 (Utah App. 1991).

In making such an award, the Court must

consider the "financial needs of the receiving spouse, the ability
of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested
fees."

Whitehead v. Whitehead. 193 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Aug. 7,

1992).
In the instant case, the court abused its discretion by
failing to take into account Susan's disadvantaged
condition and David's ability to pay.
objection to the amount requested.

financial

Furthermore, there was no
For these reasons, Susan's

request for an award of attorney fees was improperly denied and
should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
In her petition, subsequent memoranda, and the evidence
adduced at trial, Susan has established the following: First, she
has shown a substantial change in circumstances respecting her
employment and income since the entry of the Decree of Divorce.
Second, she has shown a great and immediate financial need for
assistance from David.

Finally, she has shown that David had
19

sufficient assets and financial means to assist her.

Because of

the above, the court should reverse the trial courts dismissal of
her Petition and request for temporary relief and remand for the
entry of an award of alimony and attorney fees commensurate with
her needs.
DATED this

/ v'

day of December, 1992.

J^MES B. HANKS
:torney for Susan Wells
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief was mailed, postage prepaid on the
December, 1992, to the following:
PETER W. GUYON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
433 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM
A.

Commissioner's Recomendation Denying Motion for Temporary
Alimony.

B.

Order Affirming Commissioner's Recomendation.

C.

Order Denying Temporary Alimony.

D.

Order Denying Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce.

E.

Transcript of Judge Young's Findings.

F.

U.C.A. 30-3-5(3).

G.

Rule 6-404, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
WELLS, SUSAN ANNE
CASE NUMBER 814902737 DA
DATE 09/10/91
HONORABLE MICHAEL S. EVANS
COURT REPORTER TAPE-1-7:37-15:19
COURT CLERK CPW

PLAINTIFF
VS
WELLS, DAVID JOHN
DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
MOTION HEARING
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. HANKS, JAMES B.
D. ATTY. GUYON, PETER W.

COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS:
1. REGARDING ALIMONY: SUBSTANTIAL PERIOD OF TIME HAS PASSED &
PARTIES HAVE SUPPORTED THEMSELVES. REQUEST FOR TEMP. ALIMONY
DENIED PURSUANT TO 6-404. PLTF ASKING COURT TO MAKE A DETERMINATION THAT SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES HAS OCCURRED. COURT MUST MAKE DETERMINATION THAT CHANGE HAS OCCURRED & CANNOT DO SO ON LAW & MOTION CALENDAR.
MR. GUYON PREPARE ORDER.

\SwAwjb A W M ^ ^

0327
9*2,

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
WELLS, SUSAN ANNE
CASE NUMBER 814902737 DA
DATE 10/23/91
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK NP

PLAINTIFF
VS
WELLS, DAVID JOHN
DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. HANKS, JAMES B.
D. ATTY. GUYON, PETER W.

PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO THE COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION
AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ARE EACH DENIED. MR. GUYON IS
TO PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT HEREWITH.
C.C. TO COUNSEL

—. i i

Third Judicial Oist

NOV 0 8 1991
£ COUNT!

Peter W. Guyon (1285)
Attorney for Defendant
433 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-5555
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
•--oooOooo
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
VERIFIED MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT
AND ALIMONY

SUSAN ANNE WELLS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. D-81-2737
Judge: David S. Young

DAVID JOHN WELLS,
Defendant.

oooOooo—

On t h e

10th

day

of

September,

1991,

PLAINTIFF'S

VERIFIED MOTION FOR TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY was heard
before

Commissioner

person

and

by

and

Michael
through

S. E v a n s ,
counsel

and came P l a i n t i f f

James

B.

Hanks

and

in
came

Defendant in p e r s o n and by and through counsel P e t e r W. Guyon and
t h e Commissioner,

having reviewed t h e d o c u m e n t a t i o n s u b m i t t e d by

both p a r t i e s , having l i s t e n e d t o arguments and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of
c o u n s e l and b e i n g f u l l y
Plaintiff's

advised,

and h a v i n g recommended

m o t i o n be d e n i e d as v i o l a t i v e

Judicial Administration,

and P l a i n t i f f

of 6 - 4 0 4 ,

that

Rules

of

having objected to the

Commissioner's recommendation and having r e q u e s t e d o r a l

argument

0

thereon, and both parties having submitted memoranda in support
of their respective positions, it is
ORDERED

that

Plaintiff's

objections

to

the

Commissioner's recommendation and request for oral argument are
both denied; and it is
FURTHER

ORDERED

that

Plaintiff's

VERIFIED

MOTION FOR

TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY be, and the same hereby is,
denied.
DATED this/Y

day of N06(^^(^f^^_

1991

THE COURT

District

Jkdg

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The u n d e r s i g n e d c e r t i f i e s t h a t on t h e d a t e b e l o w a
t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
VERIFIED MOTION FOR TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY was
mailed with a l l f i r s t - c l a s s postage prepaid t o :
James B. Hanks, Esq.
Kipp And Christian P.C.
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2314
DATED this &fi

day of Y^fcX/U**^-\

kLsM~&^~*—
VIIIBJ

ZS7

1991.

MAR 0 3 1992
W^efcoUNTY
JAMES B. HANKS (A4331)
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUSAN ANNE WELLS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

ORDER DENYING PETITION
TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE

:
:
Civil No- D-81-2737

DAVID JOHN WELLS,
Defendant.

:

On the 11th day of February, 1992, Plaintiff's Petition
for Modification of Divorce Decree was heard before the Honorable
David S. Young. The Plaintiff's was present and represented by her
attorney, James B. Hanks of Kipp and Christian, P.C. The Defendant
was present and represented by his attorney, Peter W. Guyon.

The

Court, having heard the testimony presented by Plaintiff finds that
the Plaintiff has not shown a substantial change in circumstances
warranting a modification of the parties' divorce decree with
respect to alimony.

The Plaintiff has the ability to support

herself and an increase of the amount of alimony would be improper
at this time. Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby orders as
follows:

1 0
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1. That Plaintiff's Petition for Modification of Divorce
Decree be, and hereby is, denied.
2. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the following
provisions shall bind both the parties insofar as medical and
dental expenses for any minor children are concerned:
A.

The custodial parent shall pay uninsured, routine

medical and dental expenses, including routine office visits,
physical examinations and immunizations; and
B.

Both parents shall share all other reasonable and

necessary uninsured medical and dental expenses equally.
3.

Both parties shall pay their own attorney fees and

costs necessitated by these proceedings.
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1

IN THE SUMMER OF 1990 SHE WAS EARNING $*t0, 000.00 A YEAR.

2

IN MAY OF 1991 SHE LOST HER JOB, SHE DIDN'T HAVE AN INCOME.

3

SO AGAIN WE HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES.

4

I THINK SHE'S MORE THAN MET HER BURDEN, YOUR

5

HONOR, AND I ASK THAT THEIR MOTION BE DENIED.

6

JUDGE YOUNG:

7

MR. GUYON?

8 I
9
10
11
12

DO YOU DESIRE TO FURTHER RESPOND,

MR. GUYON:

NO, I'LL SUBMIT THAT.

WELL, CAN

I TAKE THAT BACK?
JUDGE YOUNG:

YES, YOU MAY, IF YOU WISH TO SAY

SOMETHING FURTHER.
MR. GUYON:

JUST ONE THING, JUDGE, AND THAT IS

13

THAT THE—I THINK IT'S A PART OF THE RECORD, AND THERE WERE

14

—WELL, I THINK THAT'S INAPPROPRIATE.

15

EXAMINED ON THAT.

16

I SHOULD HAVE CROSS-

I WITHDRAW THAT.

JUDGE YOUNG:

ALL RIGHT.

I HAVE REVIEWED THE

17

FACTS THAT YOU PRESENT, MR. HANKS, AND THE—I THINK THE

18

COURT WOULD BE OBLIGATED TO FIND THAT THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE!

19

OF CIRCUMSTANCE JUST SIMPLY BY THE FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT

20

AND THEN RE-EMPLOYMENT AND THOSE KINDS OF EVENTS OCCURRING

21

IN MS. WELLS' LIFE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME I DO BELIEVE THAT

22

THERE IS NO ESTABLISHMENT OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY

23

A CHANGE IN REQUIRING ALIMONY BE PAID.

24
25

IN FACT, IT STRIKES ME THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE BOTH OF THESE PARTIES ARE UNIQUELY
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1

ABLE TO EARN SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF MONEY TO MEET THEIR

2

NEEDS AND OBLIGATIONS.

3

IS NOW 30,000.

4

EMPLOYMENT THAT SHE MUST MAKE AS TO WHETHER SHE IS GOING

5

TO RESIDE IN UTAH, IN LAYTON, OR WHETHER SHE'S GOING TO

6

MOVE TO IDAHO FALLS WHERE THE JOB IS, HER FAMILY, HER CIRCUM-

7

STANCES, HER CHILDREN, JUSTIFY THE MOVE TO IDAHO FALLS.

8

THE DETERMINATION TO LEAVE THE JOB BECAUSE SHE WAS DISSAT-

9

ISFIED WITH THE TRAVEL CHALLENGES, THOSE ARE ALL DECISIONS

HER EMPLOYMENT HAS BEEN 1*0,000,

THERE ARE DECISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THAT

10

THAT EVERYBODY HAS TO MAKE IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF THEIR

11

LIFE.

12

I DON'T SEE THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE

13

HAVE ESTABLISHED A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE COURT TO CONCLUDE!

14

THAT I OUGHT TO DO ANYTHING WITH THE ALIMONY.

15

OF FACT, I HAVE SOME BASIC CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROTECTION

16

OF THE ONE-YEAR, OR THE $1.00 PER YEAR PROVISION UNDER THE

17

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE BECAUSE BOTH PARTIES ARE ABLE-

18

BODIED PERSONS AND ABLE TO EARN INCOME.

19

ME THAT THAT PREFERENCE OF PRESERVING THAT AGAINST THE

20

PROTECTION THAT THE SAME KIND OF THING MAY HAPPEN TO THE

21

HUSBAND, HE COULD BECOME SUDDENLY UNEMPLOYED OR LOSE HIS

22

JOB FOR THE SAME KINDS OF REASONS THAT SHE DID, WOULD YET

23

DENY HIM ANY PROTECTION WHATSOEVER UNDER THE PRESENT STATUS

AS A MATTER

AND IT SEEMS TO

24 I OF THE DIVORCE DECREE.

25

SO BASED UPON THE TESTIMONY THAT I'VE HEARD,
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1

THE PRESENTATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PRESENTED HERE, THE COURT

2

FINDS THAT THE PETITION TO MODIFY SHOULD BE AND THE SAME

3

IS HEREBY DENIED.

4

I FURTHER FIND THAT EACH PARTY SHOULD BE ORDERED

5

TO PAY THEIR OWN INDIVIDUAL ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS AS

6

THEY'VE INCURRED THEM.

7

MR. GUYON, I'LL ASK YOU TO PREPARE THE ORDER.

8

MR. HANKS:

9

JUDGE, ONE MATTER.

YOUR HONOR, WE

HAD AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE A MODIFICATION TO ALLOW BOTH

10

SIDES TO PAY ONE-HALF OF UNCOVERED MEDICAL BILLS.

11

THAT WAS STIPULATED TO, YOUR HONOR.

12 I

MR. GUYON:

13

JUDGE YOUNG:

14

MR. GUYON:

15

JUDGE YOUNG:

16
17

I BELIEVE

THAT'S CORRECT, JUDGE.
AND THAT SHOULD BE AGREED UPON.
I WILL PUT THAT IN THE ORDER.
IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE THAT NEEDS

TO B E —
MR. HANKS:

YOUR HONOR, MY CLIENT HAS BEEN CON-

18

CERNED THAT ALL THE FACTS BE HEARD, AND IF THE COURT WOULD

19

INDULGE ME, SHE HAS BEEN CONCERNED SINCE THE DIVORCE THAT

20

SHE HAS TRIED TO GET OUT AND EARN AN INCOME BUT THE PROBLEM

21

SHE'S HAD IS BECAUSE OF HER LACK OF SENIORITY.

22

A HARD TIME GETTING BACK IN THE WORK PLACE.

23

EVERY TIME SHE GETS A FOOT IN THE DOOR THERE'S A REDUCTION

24

IN THE WORK FORCE AND SHE'S LAID OFF AGAIN.

25

OUR CONCERN IS THAT MR. WELLS, ON THE OTHER HAND, DIDN'T

SHE'S HAD

IT SEEMS LIKE

AND I GUESS
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HAVE TO STAY HOME WITH THE KIDS, HAD A CHANCE TO DEVELOP
A CAREER AND HE IS IN A TOTALLY DIFFERENT POSITION.

HE

IS MUCH MORE ADVANTAGED BECAUSE OF THAT, WHERE SHE MADE
SACRIFICES, STAYED HOME WITH THE KIDS, NOW SHE HAS TO GET
OUT, DEVELOP A CAREER AND IT'S JUST BEEN VERY, VERY DIFFICULT FOR HER, YOUR HONOR.
JUDGE YOUNG:
CULT.

I DON'T DOUBT THAT IT'S BEEN DIFFI-

AND SHE'S MADE SOME CHOICES IN THAT REGARD.

I SUS-

PECT THAT WHILE THEY MAY NOT BE MEASURED ECONOMICALLY THERE
WOULD BE RELATIONSHIPS THAT COULD BE, THAT HAVE BEEN GENERATED BETWEEN THE MOTHER AND THE CHILDREN THAT ARE PROBABLY
VERY DIFFERENT THAN THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THE FATHER BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THE MOTHER
HAS LIVED WITH THE CHILDREN.

AND THE CONFLICTS THAT THESE

PARENTS HAVE HAD BETWEEN THEMSELVES—I WILL SAY THAT FROM
EVERYTHING THAT I'VE BEEN ABLE TO OBSERVE IN RELATION TO
THE ACCIDENT TO THE YOUNGEST CHILD, THAT THE REPORT BY MR.
WELLS TO SOCIAL SERVICES AND OTHERS, TO ENGAGE THEM IN
INVOLVEMENT IN THIS WAS COMPLETELY IRRESPONSIBLE AND SHOULD
NOT HAVE OCCURRED.

BUT WHO KNOWS WHAT WE EACH MIGHT DO

IN THE EMOTION AND TRAGEDY OF OUR SON BEING HIT BY AN AUTOMOBILE.

SO I THINK THESE PARTIES HAVE SHOWN REMARKABLE

IMMATURITY

IN SOME OF THE THINGS THAT THEY HAVE DONE.

AND

I WILL TELL YOU THAT CANDIDLY, MR. WELLS, FACE TO FACE.
I THINK THAT WAS IRRESPONSIBLE OF YOU.

AND I THINK YOUR
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1

APPROACH TO MS. LEDEZMA WAS IRRESPONSIBLE AND INAPPROPRIATE.

2

I WOULD HOPE THAT IN THE FUTURE THOSE KINDS OF THINGS OUGHT

3

NOT TO OCCUR.

4

BUT IN ANY EVENT, THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE FACT

5

THAT SHE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO DEVELOP

6

STANCES ARE NO DIFFERENT THAN AN AWFUL LOT OF OTHER PEOPLE.

7

SHE NOW HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE EMPLOYED AT $30,000.00

8

A YEAR, AND THAT'S MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN PROBABLY 60 PERCENT

9

OF OUR POPULATION, IF NOT MORE.

10

AND THAT, TO ME, IS ADEQUATE]

INCOME TO MEET HER NEEDS.

11
12

SENIORITY, THOSE CIRCUMH

SO, IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU DESIRE FOR THE
RECORD?

13 I

MR. HANKS:

14

JUDGE YOUNG:

NO, YOUR HONOR, I THINK-ALL RIGHT.

MR. GUYON, IF YOU WILL

15

PREPARE THE ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THE RULING OF THE COURT

16

AND PRESENT THEM TO MR. HANKS FOR APPROVAL AS TO FORM.

17

COURT'S IN RECESS.

18

MR. HANKS:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

19

MR. GUYON:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

20

(WHEREUPON, THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED)

21
22 I

** ** **

23
24
25
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(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage;
(i) incurable insanity; or
(j) when the husband and wife have lived sepaatelv under a decree of separate maintenance of
r
y s tate for three consecutive years without cohabitation.
U) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection
rttfi) does not affect the liability of either party under
(J U
' provision for separate maintenance previously
^(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the
grounds of insanity unless: (i) the defendant has
been adjudged insane by the appropriate authorities of this or another state prior to the commencement of the action; and (ii) the court finds
by the testimony of competent witnesses that the
insanity of the defendant is incurable.
(b) The court shall appoint for the defendant a
guardian ad litem, who shall protect the interests
of the defendant. A copy of the summons and
complaint shall be served on the defendant in
person or by publication, as provided by the laws
of this state in other actions for divorce, or upon
his guardian ad litem, and upon the county attorney for the county where the action is prosecuted.
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the
merits of the case and if the defendant resides out
of this state, take depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and make a defense as is
just to protect the rights of the defendant and the
interests of the state.
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as the courts and
judges possess in other actions for divorce.
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may, if the defendant resides in this state, upon notice, have
the defendant brought into the court at trial, or
have an examination of the defendant by two or
more competent physicians, to determine the
mental condition of the defendant For this purpose either party may have leave from the court
to enter any asylum or institution where the defendant may be confined. The costs of court in
this action shall be apportioned by the court. 1987
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce.
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from
his wife for the same causes and in the same manner
as the wife may obtain a divorce from her husband.
1953

30-3-3. Temporary alimony and suit money.
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk
a sum of money for the separate support and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and to
enable such party to prosecute or defend the action.
1953

30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Sealing.
U) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and
signed by the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted
upon default or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the cause.
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a
child or children and the plaintiff has filed an
action in the judicial district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be
administered, a decree of divorce may not be
granted until both parties have attended a man-

2?

datory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and
have presented a certificate of course completion
to the court. The court may waive this requirement, on its own motion or on t h e motion of one
of the parties, if it determines course attendance
and completion are not necessary, appropriate,
feasible, or in the best interest of the parties,
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be
held before the court or the court commissioner
as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner
in all divorce cases shall make and file findings
and decree upon the evidence.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be
sealed by order of the court upon the motion of either
party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned
parties, the attorneys of record or attorney filing a
notice of appearance in the action, the Office of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving public assistance, or the court
have full access to the entire record. This sealing does
not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend
the decree.
1992
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4.

Repealed.

1990

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance
and health care of parties and children
— Division of debts — Court to have
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and
visitation — Termination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The
court shall include the following in every decree of
divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
and
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding
the court's division of debts, obligations, or
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of
these orders.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining
child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and

maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and
dental care, or the distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents,
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall
consider the welfare of the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However,
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party
paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if
it is further established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a court order is made
and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in t h a t action, if the court determines
t h a t t h e petition was without merit and not asserted
in good faith.
1991

30-3-5.1. Provision for income withholding in
child support order.
Whenever a court enters an order for child support,
it shall include in the order a provision for withholding income as a means of collecting child support as
provided in Title 78, Chapter 45d.
1985
30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sexual abuse — Investigation.
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request
for modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of
child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating
either party, the court shall order that an investigation be conducted by the Division of Family Services
within the Department of Human Services in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 4, Part 5. A final
award of custody or visitation may not be rendered
until a report on that investigation is received by the
court. That investigation shall be conducted by the
Division of Family Services within 30 days of the
court's notice and request for an investigation. In reviewing this report, the court shall comply with Section 78-7-9.
1992
30-3-5.5. Petition to protect abused child — Jurisdiction under this chapter.
( D A person who has filed a complaint under this
chapter may also file a petition with the district court
for a protective order for the protection of any children residing with either party to the action under
this chapter. The petition and procedures shall be the
same as for the issuance of protective orders in the
juvenile court under Sections 78-3a-20.5, 78-3a-20.6,
78-3a-20.7, 78-3a-20.8, 78-3a-20.9, and 78-3a-20.10.
The court or the cohabitant may use the protections
provided in this chapter and Title 78, Chapter 3a,
Juvenile Courts, and when necessary, those protections under Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the
Person, which provide for criminal prosecution.
(2) A person who has obtained a protective order
pursuant to this section shall notify any other court
in which another action is pending or order is issued

*4

pertaining to the same family member named in the
protective order.
199l
30-3-6. Repealed.

1985

30-3-7. When decree becomes absolute.
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute:
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and
entered by the clerk in the register of actions if
both the parties who have a child or children and
the plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial
district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the
pilot program is administered and have completed attendance at the mandatory course pre
vided in Section 30-3-11.3 except if the court
waives the requirement, on its own motion or on
the motion of one of the parties, upon determination that course attendance and completion are
not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the
best interest of the parties;
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the
court may specifically designate, unless an appeal or other proceedings for review are pending;
or
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes
absolute, for sufficient cause otherwise orders.
(2) The court, upon application or on its own motion for good cause shown, may waive, alter, or extend a designated period of time before the decree
becomes absolute, but not to exceed six months from
the signing and entry of the decree.
1992
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful.
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their marriage by decree may marry any person other than the spouse from whom the divorce was
granted until it becomes absolute. If an appeal is
taken, the divorce is not absolute until after affirmance of the decree.
1988
30-3-9.

Repealed.

1989

30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce — Custody consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future
care and custody of the minor children as it considers
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child and the past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of
the parties. The court may inquire of the children and
take into consideration the children's desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are
not controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider,
among other factors the court finds relevant, which
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the
child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the
court finds appropriate.
1988
30-3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined.
In this chapter, "joint legal custody":
(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges,
duties, and powers of a parent by both parents,
where specified;
(2) may include an award of exclusive authority by the court to one parent to make specific
decisions;
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tating settlement of any or all issues in a domestic relations case. Issues which cannot be agreed
upon by the parties at the settlement conference
shall be certified to the district court for trial;
and
(L) Conduct pretrial conferences with the parties and their counsel on all domestic relations
matters unless otherwise ordered by the presiding judge. The commissioner shall make recommendations on all issues under consideration at
the pretrial and submit those recommendations
to the district court.
(3) Duties of Court Commissioner. Under the
general supervision of the presiding judge, the court
commissioner has the following duties prior to any
domestic matter being heard by the district court:
(A) Review all pleadings in each case;
(B) Certify those cases directly to the district
court that appear to require a hearing before the
district court judge;
(C) Except in cases previously certified to the
district court, conduct hearings with parties and
their counsel for the purpose of submitting recommendations to the parties and the court;
(D) Coordinate information with the juvenile
court regarding previous or pending proceedings
involving children of the parties; and
(E) Refer appropriate cases to mediation programs if available.
(4) Objections. With the exception of pre-trial orders, the commissioner's recommendation is the order
of the court until modified by the court. Any party
objecting to the recommended order, shall file a written objection to the recommendation with the clerk of
the court and serve copies on the commissioner's office and opposing counsel. Objections shall be filed
within ten days of the date the recommendation was
made in open court or if taken under advisement, ten
days after the date of the subsequent written recommendation made by the commissioner. Objections
shall be to specific recommendations and shall set
forth reasons for each objection.
(5) Judicial review. Cases not resolved at the settlement or pretrial conference shall be set for trial on
all issues not resolved. All other matters shall be reviewed in accordance with Rule 4-501.
(6) Prohibitions.
(A) Commissioners shall not make final adjudications of domestic relations matters other
than default or uncontested divorces and modifications.
(B) Commissioners shall not serve as pro tempore judges in any matter, except as provided by
Rule of the Supreme Court.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15,
1991.)
Rule 6-402. Repealed.
Rule 6-403. Shortening 90-day waiting period in
domestic matters.
Intent:
To establish a procedure for shortening or waiving
the 90-day waiting period in domestic cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the district courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Proceedings on the merits of a divorce action
shall not be heard by the district courts unless 90
days have elapsed from the time the complaint was
filed or unless the Court finds that there is good cause
for shortening or eliminating the waiting period and
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Rule 6-406

enters a formal order to that effect prior to the hearing date.
(2) Application for a hearing less than 90 days
from the date the complaint was filed shall be made
by motion and accompanied by an affidavit setting
forth the factual matters constituting good cause. The
motion and supporting affidavit(s) shall be served on
the opposing party at least five days prior to the
scheduled hearing unless the party is in default.
(3) In the event the Court finds that there is good
cause for hearing in less than 90 days from the filing
of the complaint, the facts constituting such cause
shall be included in the findings of fact and presented
to the Court for signature.
Rule 6-404. Modification of divorce decrees.
Intent:
To establish procedures for modification of existing
divorce decrees.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all district courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be
commenced by the filing of a petition to modify in the
original divorce action. Service of the petition and
summons upon the opposing party shall be in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. No request for a modification of an existing decree shall be raised by way of an
order to show cause.
(2) The responding party shall serve the reply
within twenty days after service of the petition. Either party may file a certificate of readiness for trial.
Upon filing of the certificate, the matter shall be referred to the domestic relations commissioner prior to
trial, or in those districts where there is not a domestic relations commissioner, placed on the trial calendar.
(3) No petition for modification shall be placed on a
law and motion or order to show cause calendar without the consent of the commissioner or the district
judge.
Rule 6-405. Repealed.
Rule 6-406. Opening sealed adoption files.
Intent:
To establish uniform procedures for opening sealed
adoption files and providing identifying information
to adoptees and/or birth parents.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all district and juvenile
courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) All requests to open sealed adoption files to obtain identifying information of adoptee or birth parents shall be initiated by filing a formal petition with
the clerk of the court in the county where the adoption was granted. The petition must set forth in detail
the reasons the information is desired and must be
accompanied by a filing fee of $75.00. Neither a formal petition nor a filing fee is required to obtain certified copies of the decree.
(2) In cases where the petitioner is seeking specific
medical information to aid in the preservation of the
health of the petitioner, the petitioner must contact
the Bureau of Vital Statistics and the adoption
agency involved in the placement (if applicable) and
make a request for all non-identifying information
regarding the birth parents and other relatives. The
petition must be accompanied by a letter from a licensed physician stating what the need is and

